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TRUSTS-INTERCHANGEABILITY OF THE INTER

Vivos

TRUST AND

VALIDITY-Assuming interchangeability, an inter vivos trust used in place of a will may bring
numerous advantages.' Although there is no tax saving,2 the inter
vivos trust, unlike a will, provides expert management of the trust

THE WILL-VARIOUS TESTS OF TRUST

property during the life of the settlor,3 avoids delay and expense
incident to probate proceedings, 4 avoids the continuing necessity
of approval of accounts in a "court" trust, and obviates the necessity of ancillary proceedings where the property is located in
several states.5 In addition, it may be possible by use of the inter
vivos trust to avoid certain statutory restraints on the freedom of
testamentary disposition. 6

In view of these and undoubtedly

other advantages, the practical potentiality of the inter vivos trust
in estate planning is obvious.
The use of this appealing dispositive arrangement in lieu of a
will, however, is impeded by the immense difficulty in discerning
with any preciseness the degree to which the inter vivos trust
and the will may be used interchangeably. The feature of a will
which distinguishes it from other methods of disposition is that it
remains ambulatory until the death of the testator. 7 In order,
I See,

generally, 1 BowE, ESTATE

PLANNING AND TAXATION

183-188 (1957);

CASNER, Es-

TATE PLANNING, 2d ed., 87-106

(1956); Heffernan and Williams, "Revocable Trusts in
Estate Planning," 44 CORN. L.Q. 524 at 531-542 (1959); King, "Trusts as Substitutes for
Wills," 14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1 (1941). The use of an inter vivos trust in place of a will
does not necessarily presuppose that the testamentary method of disposing of property at
death is dispensed with entirely. An inter vivos trust may be utilized to dispose of part of
the estate while a will is used conjointly to dispose of the rest.
2
See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 2d ed., 99 (1956); Heffernan and Williams, "Revocable Trusts in Estate Planning," 44 CoRN. L.Q. 524 at 531-537 (1959).
3 See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 2d ed., 99 (1956). If the settlor should afterward
become incompetent, the trust will still be operative to dispose of his property at his
death, whereas the advent of his incompetency would render subsequent testamentary
disposition open to attack. In addition, the inter vivos trust gives the settlor the reassurance of seeing his dispositive machinery in operation and having opportunity to defend
it if attack is made on it during his lifetime. The possibility of an attack on the trust
during the settlor's lifetime, however, is rather remote. See note 9 infra.
4 See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING,

2d ed., 100-102 (1956); Heffernan and Williams, "Rev-

ocable Trusts in Estate Planning," 44 CoRN. L.Q. 524 at 538-539 (1959); King, "Trusts as
Substitutes for Wills," 14 RocKy MT. L. REv. I at 3-4 (1941). For a comparison of the
relative over-all costs of the inter vivos and testamentary trust, see I BowE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION

186-187 (1957). Of course, whether the inter vivos trust would be less

expensive may depend upon how long the settior lives after executing it. In addition to
avoiding delay and expense incident to probate proceedings, the use of the inter vivos trust
avoids notoriety as to the dispositive arrangement.
5 See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 2d ed., 102 (1956); Heffernan and Williams, "Revocable Trusts in Estate Planning," 44 CoRN. L.Q. 524 at 539 (1959).
6 E.g., the spouse's election statute and the mortmain statute. Whether or not it is
and should be possible to avoid these statutes by use of the inter vivos trust in place of a
will is considered more fully later in this comment.
7 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 at 470, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944).
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therefore, for an inter vivos trust to take the place of a will, the
settlor must reserve to himself some of the principal rights and
powers of ownership.8 The reservation of these rights and powers
by the settlor adds to the trust, in varying degree, the ambulatory'
feature which is characteristic of a will. Emerging from the great
body of litigation in this area, however, are limitations on the
degree to which an inter vivos trust may be made ambulatory and
still remain a valid trust.9 This comment will be devoted to an
examination of various tests of trust validity in this setting and
their relative utility as tools for analysis.
I.

A

TESTAMENTARY TEST

Where the validity of an alleged inter vivos trust is in issue, it
appears anomalous to analyse the problem from the standpoint of
whether the disposition is testamentary, that is, whether it is a
will.1o When an owner of property intends and attempts one type
of disposition, to say that he has effected an entirely different type
of disposition seems to be a needlessly roundabout way of saying
that he has failed to accomplish his purpose. An underlying
rationale for the indirect approach, however, may be found in the
notion that it is inexcusably evasive to accomplish by one method
of disposition that which has traditionally been done by another
method governed by a different set of rules. According to this
notion, a court, in order to prevent evasion, should look to the
substance rather than the form of the transaction. The question
to be examined is whether there is any room for this kind of reasoning in the setting of the inter vivos trust used in place of a will.
8 Those most typically reserved are the right to income for life, the power to revoke,
amend or modify, and the power in some form to control the administration of the trust
without being a trustee.
9 Theoretically, a trust may have been invalid from the start for the reason that title
did not pass to the trustee, or because an agency rather than a trust relationship was
created incident to an effective transfer of title. On the other hand, a trust may be invalid
only after the death of the settlor. The usual example of the latter situation is where
no interest passed in praesenti to the remainderman-beneficiary at the time of the creation
of the trust. The instrument is not effective to pass an interest at the time of the settlor's
death, because presumably it was not executed in accordance with the requirements of
the statute of wills. For practical purposes, however, since an attack on the trust almost
invariably comes after the death of the settlor, the words "valid" and "invalid" will be
used in this comment to refer generally to whether the trust may be given operative effect
after the death of the settlor, and not specifically to whether the trust was invalid ab initio
or only at this later time.
10 Although the courts and writers commenting on their decisions often conclude
rather loosely that an alleged inter vivos trust is "testamentary," it is clear that what is
meant is that the instrument does not effect a valid inter vivos disposition, and not that it
is a will.
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More specifically, do the rules which govern testamentary dispositions reflect policies of such importance that they should not
be permitted to be "evaded" by the use of the inter vivos trust as
a substitute for a will? Do they require a court to look behind the
form to the substance of the transaction? To the extent to which
these questions are answered in the affirmative, the indirect approach which places primary emphasis on whether the disposition
is testamentary may be justified.
A.

The Surviving Spouse

One of the most significant and widespread rules governing
testamentary disposition is found in statutes giving the surviving
spouse an election to take against the will of the deceased spouse.1'
Although the majority of courts refuse to apply a different test for
determining the validity of an inter vivos trust simply because the
attack on the trust is by the surviving spouse,'1 2 there is merit in the
argument that the policy behind the spouse's election statutes
dictates that a more stringent test be employed. The substitutionary potentiality of the inter vivos trust should not be so complete as to provide a device whereby the surviving spouse can, in
practical effect, be disinherited entirely.13 Perhaps the easiest
and most practicable solution, in light of the majority view, would
be corrective legislation,'14 but unfortunately this solution has not
been, and does not seem likely to be, generally adopted. In the
absence of statutory aid, a minority of courts have offered solutions
which have made inroads on the law governing inter vivos trusts.
Some of these courts hold the trust voidable where there is proof
of intent to deprive the spouse of the statutory share. 5 Others
hold the trust void as to the spouse where it can be shown that the
transfer was illusory.16 The obvious defect in these solutions lies
11 See

statutes cited in 2 ScoTr, TRusTS, 2d ed., §146A, n. 1 (1956).
12See, e.g., Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E. (2d) 198 (1956); Rose v. Union
Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W. (2d) 458 (1942). These cases uniformly apply
what will be referred to later in this comment as a "quantitative test" to all the inter
vivos trust cases in this area regardless of who is making the attack on the trust. See also
I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND §57, comment c (1959).
18 See SIMEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 25-31 (1955).
14 See Simes, "Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead Hand," 26
UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 1 at 15-16 (1957); comment, 37 CORN. L.Q. 258 at 270 (1952) (recommending a legislative solution of this problem in the setting of the Totten trust); note, 40
GEo L.J. 109 at 121 (1951). See also Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.11, one of
the few attempts which have been made to deal with this problem by legislation.
15 Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. (2d) 509 (1940); Merz v. Tower Grove
Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W. (2d) 611 (1939).
16 Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. (2d) 378 (1947); Newman v. Dore, 275
N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937).
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in the often insurmountable difficulty of proving intent to deprive
the spouse of the statutory share or illusoriness of the transfer. In
addition, it is doubtful whether these rules do more than partially
solve the problem. The policy behind the spouse's statutory share,
if deemed applicable to transactions effected during the lifetime
of the deceased, is not logically limited to transactions where there
is an intent to evade it. It is aimed rather at ensuring that the
surviving spouse will be provided for regardless of whether the
decedent intends not to provide or fails to do so inadvertently.
Nor is the policy behind the statutory share logically limited to
illusory transfers. Moreover, this type of transfer is so ill-defined
and apparently so infrequent that the inroad on the usual standard
of validity is of dubious significance. 17 In view of these considerations, it would seem that a testamentary test of some sort could
justifiably be applied. The following suggestion is made. If the
inter vivos trust was used as a substitute for a will, it should be
treated as a will at the instance of the surviving spouse, wholly without regard to the validity of the trust, on the ground that the policy
of the spouse's election statute requires this result. The form of
the transaction should be completely disregarded, and the court
should look solely to its substance. The principal question, of
course, is whether the trust was used as a substitute for a will. The
determination of this question could be left to a vague approach
as broad as the question itself, but this would do nothing to alleviate the defects inherent in the fraudulent intent and illusory
transfer tests referred to above. To obtain predictable results, the
analysis should turn upon some reservation of powers which gives
the inter vivos trust to a substantial degree the ambulatory feature
characteristic of a will. The test suggested here is reservation of
the power to revoke, or its equivalent, and the right to receive income for life.' 8 It could then be stated as a rule of simple and
just application that the surviving spouse may elect to treat the
remaining corpus of a "revocable" inter vivos trust with income
for life to the decedent as part of his estate for the purpose of
17 Compare Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937) with Matter of
Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. (2d) 120 (1951). See Simes, "'Protecting the Surviving
Spouse by Restraints on the Dead Hand," 26 UNIv. CIN. L. REv. 1 at 7-15 (1957).
18 The power to revoke and the right to income for life are not suggested at random.
The settlor, when he uses an inter vivos trust in place of a will, almost invariably reserves
the power to revoke or some related power which gives him the same control, such as a
general power of appointment, because without such a power he does not have the ultimate
means with which to effectuate a complete change of heart up to the time of his death.
The additional reservation of a beneficial life interest means that the settlor in substance,
although perhaps not in form, has given up nothing during his lifetime.
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determining the statutory share. This standard of inter vivos
trust validity would seem superior to other standards which have
been suggested as solutions to this problem. The adoption by
analogy of the standards applicable in the setting of federal estate
taxation 9 has the undeniable virtue of certainty in view of the
frequent interpretation which they have received, but the application of such far-reaching standards woud have the undesirable
effect of elevating the status of the surviving spouse to that of ward
of the state. It is probable that the policy of freedom of alienation
and stability of transfer would wither before such an encroach2 0ment. The solution offered by the Pennsylvania legislature
probably comes the closest to the standard suggested in this comment, but, as previously noted, it appears unlikely that other state
legislatures will follow suit. The judicial solution seems more
plausible, especially in view of the modern tendency to uphold the
trust regardless of an overwhelming reservation of powers by the
settlor, a tendency to be given more attention later in this comment. Suffice it to say here that as greater reservations of powers
are permitted, there will be increasing pressure upon the courts
to carve out an exception to the usual standards of validity in order
to avoid the policy of protecting the widow from disherison.
B. Creditors' Rights
Another familiar rule governing testamentary disposition is
that the creditors at the death of the testator have a claim on his
estate superior to that of the beneficiaries under his will.21

The

use of the inter vivos trust in place of a will presents the problem
of whether the creditors at the death of the settlor have or should
have a claim on the trust property superior to that of the remainderman-beneficiary. This problem has been resolved by
statute in many states. One type of statute provides that if the
settlor reserves a power of revocation, he shall be treated as
absolute owner of the trust property so far as the rights of creditors
are concerned. 22 Another statute allows a court of equity, at the
suit of the creditors, to compel the settlor to exercise the power of
revocation. 23 For obvious reasons, this statute has been held in19 See Simes, "Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead Hand," 26
CrN. L. Rlv. I at 15-16 (1957).
OPa. Stat Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.11.
21 ATKINSON, W=uS 77 (1937).
22E.g., 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §145; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1951)
§56-610.
23 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §1335.01.
UNIV.
2
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applicable after the death of the settlor.24 Still another type of
statute renders a transfer into trust for the use of the transferor
void as against the creditors of the transferor.25 It has been held
that reservation of a power to revoke brings the transfer within
the statute, 26 but the better view is that the statute does not apply
if a beneficial interest resides in a person other than the transferor.2 7 Finally, under the National Bankruptcy Act,28 the trustee
in bankruptcy may reach all powers which the bankrupt might
have exercised for his own benefit. It would seem that this
would include the power to revoke. Where these statutes apply
to the inter vivos trust used in place of a will the result, in practical
effect, is the application of a testamentary test of validity. The
statutes broaden the definition of a will for the benefit of creditors,
and the alleged inter vivos trust is approached from the standpoint
of whether it falls within the statutory definition of a testamentary
disposition.29
Absent an applicable statute the conveyance may still be
regarded as a fraud on the creditors of the settlor, and therefore
void at their election, if it was made with the intent to place
property beyond the reach of either present or future creditors.30
However, if there is no applicable statute and no fraud, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that the creditors may not reach
the interest of the remainderman-beneficiary. 31 Whether a testamentary test of the sort suggested in connection with the discussion
of the statutory share of the surviving spouse should be applied
for the benefit of creditors is a dose question. It may be argued
that the res of a revocable trust is substantially an asset in the
hands of the settlor and should therefore be available for payment
24 Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E. (2d) 119 (1939).

E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §33-101; Wash. Rev. Code §19.36.202.
26 Herd v. Chambers, 158 Kan. 614, 149 P. (2d) 538 (1944). However, this case is
distinguishable on the ground that the settlor reserved a general power of appointment
in addition to a power to revoke.
27 See Van Stewart v. Townsend, 176 Wash. 311, 28 P. (2d) 999 (1934) (where the
whole beneficial interest was in persons other than the settlor).
2830 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1958) §110(a). In addition, the Bankruptcy Act provides that a transfer without consideration made by the bankrupt within
one year of bankruptcy may be set aside in the bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. (1958)
§107 (d) (2).
29 This is also the practical effect of the federal estate tax statutes. See I.R.C., § §2036,
2038 (a). No attempt has been made to include in this comment a discussion of the relation
of the tax laws to the inter vivos trust used as a substitute for a will, because the tax laws
so dearly reflect a policy which takes precedence over that of promoting free alienability.
80 See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., §§316-340 (1940).
Note the analogy here to some of the surviving spouse cases. See note 15 supra.
31 See 1 PERuY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 7th ed., §96, p. 117 (1929). See also 92 A.L.R.
282 (1934).
25
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of his just debt. On the other hand, it may be argued that persons
who extended credit after the creation of the trust should be held
to have contracted with respect to existing security. In the case
of prior creditors, rebuttal of the creditors' argument by the trust
beneficiary is more difficult. However, the plight of the creditor
does not seem analogous to that of the surviving spouse, who may,
for all practical purposes, be disinherited by the use of an inter
vivos trust. The spouse can do nothing to obtain "security,"
whereas the creditor is generally in a position to refuse credit to
one whom he considers a poor risk. The policy favoring those who
cannot help themselves is stronger than that favoring those who
can. In addition, the prevalence of statutes in this area indicates it
is probably more sensible to conclude that the matter should be
32
left to legislative discretion.
C. Mortmain Statutes
Another rule governing testamentary dispositions which should
be briefly examined is the one embodied in so-called mortmain
statutes. One type provides that a testator cannot devise or bequeath for charitable purposes more than a certain proportion of
his property.3 3 Another type precludes a testator from devising or
bequeathing property for charitable purposes by a will executed
within a specified period immediately prior to his death.34 The
question presented is whether the use of the inter vivos trust as a
substitute for a will may or should avoid the operation of these
statutes. The courts in general have been unwilling to apply a
special test of validity where the inter vivos trust works a disposition which would have been invalid under the mortmain statutes
if attempted by will.35 There is at least one statute, however,
which would require a contrary result if the trust is executed within one month before the settlor's death. 36 Assuming that a testamentary test or its statutory equivalent would be applied on
behalf of the surviving spouse, the question is reduced to whether
the expectancy of the children, parents and descendants should be
protected as against an otherwise valid inter vivos trust for chari82 Cf. note, 89 Ky. L.J. 181 at 134-135 (1950).
33E.g., 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §17.
34 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2107.06.
35 Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E. (2d) 627 (1938); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Charity Organization Society, 238 App. Div. 720, 265 N.Y.S. 267
(1933), affd. mem. 264 N.Y. 441, 191 N.E. 504 (1934); President of Bowdoin College v.
Merritt, (N.D. Cal. 1896) 75 F. 480.
36 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 10, §12.
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table purposes. A prominent writer has argued that what in effect
would amount to a testamentary test should be judicially applied,
citing as an analogy the problem as it arises with respect to the
statutory share of the surviving spouse.3 7 Since the expectancy of
the children, parents and descendants may as easily be defeated
by devise or bequest to a stranger, however, regardless of when the
will is drawn or what percentage of the testator's property it involves, the analogy to the surviving spouse situation is not too well
drawn. The policy behind the type of statute which prevents a
devise or bequest to a charity within a certain period before the
death of the testator would not seem to be primarily to prevent
disherison. It appears aimed rather at preventing the bitterness
or senility that sometimes accompanies old age from obscuring
in the eyes of the testator the natural objects of his bounty. The
policy behind the statutes which limit the percentage of property
which may be devised or bequeathed to charity is probably in part
aimed at preventing the same thing, even though the fact that it
is applicable to a will which is drawn at any time during the life of
the testator might indicate that the emphasis is on preventing
disherison. Whatever the policy, in view of the fact that it may so
easily be avoided either by outright gift to a charity during the life
of the deceased or by devise or bequest to a stranger, it would
hardly seem justifiable to apply a testamentary test to an inter
vivos trust which may be availed of to accomplish a similar objective. Indeed, the limited effectiveness of the mortmain statutes
suggests a legislative intent to confine their application to strictly
testamentary dispositions.
D.

Inter Vivos Trusts in General

The rules of most uniform application to testamentary dispositions, of course, are those contained in the statute of wills.
Are the policy considerations which underlie the statute of wills
such as to justify a testamentary test of the validity of inter vivos
trusts in general when they are used in place of wills? The purpose of the statute of wills is to avoid fraudulent claims and otherwise to assure that a testamentary disposition is in accordance with
the intention of the testator.3 8 But is this purpose any different
37 See 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., pp. 2612-2613 (1956).
3s See comment, 51 N.W. UNIV. L. Rxv. 113 (1956). The statute of wills seeks to provide assurance as to the intention of the testator not only to prevent fraudulent claims, but
also to be assured that the testator meant his expressions to be given formal effect when he
dies.
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from that underlying the rules governing inter vivos conveyances?
The answer must be negative. The stringency of the requirements
for a valid will as compared to the requirements for a valid inter
vivos disposition is explained by the fact that the testator, unlike
an inter vivos conveyancer, is not present to defend and explain
his intentions when they are sought to be given effect. 39 It is true
that the attack on an inter vivos trust used in place of a will almost
invariably comes after the death of the settlor, but, unlike the
maker of a will, he has had an opportunity to see his dispositive
arrangement in operation and presumably to revoke it if it is not
in accordance with his intention. If there was ever thought to
have been a policy underlying the statute of wills which was sui
generis, it now seems clear that the courts no longer recognize it.
The 1947 revision of section 57 of the Restatement of Trusts
stated that if an interest passes to the beneficiary during the life of
the settlor, a trust will not be held testamentary merely because
certain types of powers are retained, "unless the terms are so informally stated and the power of control reserved is so great that
it would violate the policy of the Statute of Wills to enforce it."
40
The latest edition of the Restatement omits this quoted passage
and thereby supports the inference that the policy underlying the
statute of wills is no longer regarded as inconsistent with informality and reservation of a large quantum of control. Virtually
uncontradicted cases have declared that the fact that the settlor's
intent was to evade the statute of wills is irrelevant to the question
of the validity of an inter vivos trust.41 Certainly if an evasive
intent is the only basis upon which the strictest of courts will
invalidate an otherwise valid inter vivos trust in the setting of the
statutory share of the surviving spouse and of creditors' rights, it
would follow a fortiori that the policy of the statute of wills does
not justify application of a testamentary test to inter vivos trusts
in general when they are used in place of wills. As applied to
inter vivos trusts in general, then, the notion that it is inexcusably
evasive to accomplish by one method of disposition that which may
also be accomplished by another method is unsound. There is no
39

In some particulars it may even be said that the requirements for a valid inter
vivos disposition are stricter. Consider, for example, the requirement of delivery in the
law of gifts. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §§38-45 (1955).
40 See I TRusTs RESTATEMENT SECOND §57 (1959).
41 E.g., Denver Nat. Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P. (2d) 667 (1958); National
Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944); Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb.
650, 4 N.W. (2d) 737 (1942).
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evasion which would justify a court's looking to the substance in
disregard of the form of the transaction.
These considerations indicate that the testamentary test has
limited utility as a tool of analysis. Bearing in mind the small areas
in which it may be a justifiable test of the validity of an inter vivos
trust used in place of a will, it is necessary to proceed to a consideration of the relative merits of two additional tests as applied to
the larger residual area.

II. A

QUANTITATIVE TEST

By far the most frequently employed test of inter vivos trust
validity in this residual area may be characterized as a "quantitative test." According to this test, the validity of the trust after the
death of the settlor depends upon the cumulative effect of the
powers which he has retained over the trust property and its management. If the settlor has kept back too many of the incidents of
ownership, the trust will fail because 42 (1) no interest may be
deemed to have passed in praesenti to the remainderman-beneficiary,43 (2) no effective transfer has been made to the trustee,44 (3)
the trustee is merely the agent of the settlor,45 or (4) the disposition
is testamentary in nature. 46 In applying a quantitative test the
court hypothesizes a never-defined line of demarcation fixing the
outer limits of the extent to which an inter vivos trust may be used
in place of a will. Each case requires a weighing of the total powers
retained by the settlor, and if the scales are tipped, the trust is
declared inoperative after his death.
Two basic objections can be made to a quantitative approach.
First, since the line of demarcation is never defined, but only hy42 The reasons given for the failure of the trust should not be mistaken for the test
which is employed. The former are merely conclusions of law while the latter is the tool
used for analysis. But see 1 TRUSTS R-rSATEMENT SECOND §57 (1959), which says: "Where
an interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary other than the settlor, the
disposition is not . . . invalid . . . merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life
interest or because he reserves in addition... [various powers]." It would seem, however,
that the creation of an interest in a beneficiary other than the settlor is not intended to
be made a determinant of trust validity. The cases relied upon by the reporter generally
apply what has been referred to here as a quantitative test. See 3 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT
SECOND §57 (Reporter's Notes) (1959).
43 See 1 Scorr, Tusrs, 2d ed., §56 (1956).
44 Atlantic Nat. Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W. (2d) 2
(1948).
45 Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P. (2d) 589 (1936). An alleged trustee may have
acquired legal title and still remain the agent of the settlor. See 1 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed.,
§57.2, p. 450 (1956).
46 Application of Cerchia, 279 App. Div. 734, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 753 (1951). See note
10 supra.
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pothesized, the test does not produce maximum predictability, a
desirable effect of a rule of law. This does not mean, of course,
that the decided cases have no precedent value. For example, it is
well settled that an inter vivos trust is not invalid where the settlor
transfers in trust, reserving a beneficial life estate and a power to
revoke, amend or modify the trust.4 7 The same is true where the
settlor declares a trust reserving the same incidents of ownership. 48
The precedent value of the decided cases, however, is derived from
a comparison of the facts involved, rather than resting upon a definitive rule of law of more general application. This point is
emphatically illustrated by reference to the most contentiously
litigated reservation of power in this area-the power to participate
in the administration of the trust without being a trustee. The
modern cases accept the general proposition that some measure
of control over the administration of the trust may be retained, 49
but even this assurance was hard won at the cost of much needless
litigation.50 The modern cases are in confusion, however, over the
extent of control which is permissible.51 This confusion is inherent
in the test which is employed. Depending as it does upon a degree
standard, a quantitative test gives no definite answer to questions
posed by the multitudinous types of control which might be retained over the administration of the trust. A separate answer must
be given as to the propriety of each type of control. Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that a quantitative test is not sufficiently
informative to the estate planner who must know to what extent
the inter vivos trust and the will may be used interchangeably.
The second objection to a quantitative test is more fundamental. Like a testamentary test, although admittedly to a lesser
degree, a quantitative test is founded upon the notion that the
47 Denver Nat. Bank v. Von Brecht, 187 Colo. 88, 822 P. (2d) 667 (1958); Ascher v.
Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E. (2d) 458 (1956). For further cases, see 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS, 2d
ed., §57.1, n. 1 (1956).
48 Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E. (2d) 607 (1956); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. (2d)
417, 125 N.E. (2d) 600 (1955). For further cases, see 1 Sco'rr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §57.6, n. 2
(1956).
4 Denver Nat. Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 522 P. (2d) 667 (1958); Rippon v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 213 Md. 215, 131 A. (2d) 695 (1957); Estate of Steck,
275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W. (2d) 729 (1957); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E. (2d) 607 (1956).
50 See Warso v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924),
made obsolete by a statute making such a trust valid, Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) §231.205; Smith
v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229, 46 Am. Rep. 216 (1883) which was also probably made obsolete
by a statute making such a trust valid, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953) §6-509.
51 The similarity of fact situations which have brought contrary results in different
jurisdictions employing the same test of validity is striking. For example, compare Hanson
v. Denckla, (Fla. 1956) 100 S. (2d) 378, revd. on other grounds, 857 U.S. 235 (1958) with
Stouse v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914.
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distinction between inter vivos and testamentary dispositions is
one of substance rather than purely one of form. It is a general
rule of conveyancing that a reservation of less than all that is
conveyed, provided that it is in the form of a condition subsequent, will not invalidate the conveyance or the condition subsequent. This is a rule of form. There is an exception to this
rule, of course, where a reservation of powers contravenes some
established policy. This exception is 'oncerned with the substance
of the transaction. Leaving aside those instances discussed under
the heading of "A Testamentary Test" where it was concluded
that it was justifiable to look to the substance of the transaction, it
is difficult to support any additional deviation from the general
rule which is concerned only with form. No one is hurt whom it
is the policy of the law to protect. No compelling reason exists
why maximum effect should not be given the intention of the
owner of property in making disposition thereof. 52 The conclusion is manifest, therefore, that a quantitative test as applied
generally to inter vivos trusts used in lieu of a will is devoid of
underlying justification.
In light of these criticisms directed at a quantitative test, it now
remains to inquire whether there is another method of analysis
which may produce greater predictability, and which is more
capable of justification with regard to underlying rationale.

III.

FORM OF WORDS AS MEASURING VALIDITY

In formulating a more fruitful method of analysis, the guiding
consideration should be that maximum effect be given to the intention of the donor insofar as it is consistent with formal rules of
conveyancing and related public policy. The suggested standard
is that the form of the words used by the settlor shall determine
the validity of a trust not executed in compliance with the statute
of wills. Under this test the relevant inquiry is whether the settlor
intended a trust operative during his lifetime, as opposed to an
agency relationship between himself and the alleged trustee53
52 See the discussion, supra, concerning whether or not the policy behind the statute
of wills justifies the application of a testamentary test to the inter vivos trust in general.
The same conclusions would apply with equal force to a quantitative test.
53 It has been well stated that "The two relations, trust and agency, apparently grew
from the same sources, but one developed in equity and the other in law. As a result there
are, today, differences in legal incidents which attend the two relationships, but no determinant, save perhaps the intent of the parties, by which a particular arrangement may
be recognized as one or the other." Comment, 14 WASH. AND LE L. REv. 331 at 334-335
(1957).
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This intent should be considered presumptively established by
the words which the settlor employs in making the transfer. If he
says "trust" and describes the legal incidents of a trust, these words
should control, regardless of the quantum of reserved powers. But
if it should appear that in actual operation the relationship between transferee and settlor was in fact inconsistent with trust,
then it would be open by parol to rebut the presumption arising
from the words employed. 54 It should not be supposed, of course,
that this emphasis upon intent, of itself, is much of an innovation.
In a number of cases it was thought to be of controlling importance
whether the settlor intended to execute a trust operative during
his lifetime. 5 Other cases which emphasize form in connection
with the transfer reflect a similar consideration. 6 The novelty of
the proposed test lies rather in the fact that it would exclude all
other inquiries in the absence of facts calling into play an established policy of protecting surviving spouses or creditors or a policy
against certain kinds of charitable bequests.
As indicated above, modern cases have been primarily concerned with the effect to be attributed to control retained over the
adniinistration of the trust. A quantitative test was seen to have
hypothesized a line marking the number and significance of the
duties which the trustee must be given to perform without necessity of deferring to the unbridled discretion of the settlor. What
effect would the application of the proposed test have upon the
retention of control by the settlor over the administration of the
trust? The requirement that there be a manifestation of an intention to create a trust means that the owner of the property must
intend to create the legal incidents of a trust.57 One of the legal
incidents of a trust is a trustee with duties to perform independent5
4 See Hanson v. Denckla, (Fla. 1956) 100 S. (2d) 378 at 384, revd. on other grounds
357 U.S. 285 (1958), where the court thought it to be of importance that the settlor frequently exercised his reserved power to appoint beneficiaries, as bearing on whether he
regarded the trust as ambulatory in nature. The parol evidence rule does not stand in the
way, especially in view of the fact that the only real difference between an agency and a trust
is the intention of the parties. Evidence of intent would seem to fall clearly within the
ambiguous instrument exception to the parol evidence rule. See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §220 (1954).
55 Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P. (2d) 797 (1935) (striking down an alleged
trust on the ground that no trust was intended); American Bible Soc. v. Mortgage Guaranty
Co., 217 Cal. 9, 17 P. (2d) 105 (1932) (upholding the trust on the ground that one was
intended, without reference to the possibility of holding it testamentary).
56 E.g., Stouse v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914; Sheasley
Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A. (2d) 448 (1951); Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich.
78, 1 N.W. (2d) 458 (1942).
57 See I ScoTr, TRusTs, 2d ed., §23 (1956).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

ly of the discretion of the settlor.5 s

[ Vol. 58

Unlike a quantitative test,

however, the proposed test is satisfied so long as there are any
duties given the trustee, regardless of when they are to be performed or of how significant they may be.59 The proposed test is
not one of degree, but rather one of presence or absence of the
formal requisites of a trust. Given any duties in the trustee, the
only relevant evidence that would support a finding of invalidity
is parol evidence that the settlor did not actually intend what he
described, as where he actually did exercise an unbridled discretion over the administration of the trust without protest on the part
of the trustee. 60
As the above discussion illustrates, the proposed test will create
a greater degree of predictability than others discussed. The
court does not hypothesize an undefined line which allows it to
pick and choose on the facts of each case between duties given and
powers retained. Predictability is predicated on a definitive rule
of general application rather than upon comparison of the facts
of prior cases.
From the standpoint of underlying justification, the proposed
test likewise seems to be on sounder ground. There is no artificial
limit to the powers that may be reserved in the form of conditions
subsequent in the absence of a policy which requires the application of an alternative testamentary test such as that discussed
above. In short, by looking to form rather than substance maximum effect is given to the intention of the donor where there is
no discernible reason why it should not be given effect.
It remains to be seen how and to what extent the new test fits
into existing law. Is it a practical and logical evolution of existing
law, or is it merely wishful thinking without any practicable possibilities? Even though the courts have, by virtue of the vagueness of the quantitative test now employed, retained power to
strike down a trust, the definite trend of the cases over the past
decade has been toward upholding trusts notwithstanding larger
58 Even in the case of a declaration of trust, the declarer-trustee is not free to do with
the property as he wishes, but is bound by the terms of the trust. 1 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed.,

§17.1 (1956).

59 Of course, the proverbial "hard case" where the setflor reserves virtually all that
was transferred presents theoretical difficulties. However, the writer does not feel that the
hard case requires him to relent. From a practical standpoint, the really hard case almost
never occurs for the reason that the settlor has no need of reserving such a large quantum
of powers in order to accomplish his purpose. In addition, the admission of degree would
leave the proposed test open to the same criticisms as those directed at a quantitative test.
60 See note 54 supra.
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and larger reservations of power.6 It would seem that the logical
extension of these cases and the ultimate result of the trend which
they represent could be that the form of the transaction will control without regard to any substantive inconsistency suggested by
the powers reserved. Having reached this point, if the courts continue to refuse to distinguish between an attack by a surviving
spouse (and perhaps a creditor of the settlor) and an attack by a
disappointed would-be legatee, it is reasonable to anticipate that
legislation would be forthcoming to require them to do so. It
would appear, therefore, that the law is moving toward the dual
standards described in this comment as the testamentary test and
the formal, or intent, test.
Stephen B. Flood, S. Ed.
61 See, e.g., Denver Nat. Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P. (2d) 667 (1958);
Rippon v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 213 Md. 215, 131 A. (2d) 695 (1957); Estate
of Steck, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W. (2d) 729 (1957); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E. (2d)
607 (1956); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. (2d) 417, 125 N.E. (2d) 600 (1955); Stouse v. First
Nat. Bank of Chicago, (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914; Sheasley Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A.
(2d) 448 (1951); Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E. (2d) 238 (1950);
Merchants Nat. Bank v. Weinold, 12 I1. App. (2d) 209, 138 N.E. (2d) 840 (1956); MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S. (2d) 286 (1952), affd. mem. sub nom. Matter
of MacGregor, 305 N.Y. 576, 111 N.E. (2d) 445 (1953); Matter of Ford, 279 App. Div. 152,
108 N.Y.S. (2d) 122 (1951), affd. mem. 304 N.Y. 598, 107 N.E. (2d) 87 (1952).

